Showing posts with label politics and policy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label politics and policy. Show all posts

Friday, April 19, 2019

Very low utilization of advance care planning (ACP) CPT codes among hospitalists


From a recent study:

We analyzed advance care planning (ACP) billing for adults aged 65 years or above and who were managed by a large national physician practice that employs acute care providers in hospital medicine, emergency medicine and critical care between January 1, 2017 and March 31, 2017. Prompting hospitalists to answer the validated “surprise question” (SQ; “Would you be surprised if the patient died in the next year?”) for inpatient admissions served to prime hospitalists and triggered an icon next to the patient’s name. Among 113,621 hospital-based encounters, only 6,146 (5.4%) involved a billed ACP conversation: 8.3% among SQ-prompted who answered “no” and 4.1% SQ-prompted who answered “yes” (for non-SQ prompted cases, the fraction was 3.5%; P less than .0001). ACP conversations were associated with a comfort-focused care trajectory. Low ACP rates among even those with high hospitalist-predicted mortality risk underscore the need for quality improvement interventions to increase hospital-based ACP.

The last sentence is a non sequitur. The codes are an unreliable measure because many, I would wager most, ACP discussions are not billed with these particular codes. Many hospitalists don’t even know they exist. The codes, 99497 and 99498, were not even included in the fee schedule until 2016 so they were brand new at the time of the study.

Ten years ago similar codes were proposed under the Affordable Care Act but spurred fierce debate around “death panel” fears. Those provisions were dropped before final passage of the law. What’s interesting is how these provisions were slipped in out of most people’s awareness, with no public debate to speak of, seven years later. Political winds change and people are easily distracted.

Only the American Association of Physicians and Surgeons, (AAPS), a relatively minor player in the larger physician community, seemed to mind. They argued that the codes, which pay more than ordinary CPT codes, would incentivize doctors to talk patients out of life prolonging treatments. That’s an oversimplification, of course, because some ACP conversations produce decisions for more care, not lessThat said, the intent of the measure is to reward doctors for giving less care toward the end of life.  It creates the perception of a conflict of interest though based on the data above the measure has had minimal impact.

The public debate about the proposal in 2009 was confused. The idea of the “death panel” (merely an inflammatory term for an advance care discussion) was nothing new. We had been having those discussions for decades. Moreover, the pre-existing ordinary CPT codes already rewarded doctors for long discussions through the provision that a higher level of service could be coded if greater than half the encounter time was spent in counseling or care coordination. Nobody on either side of the debate seemed aware of those facts.

Saturday, March 23, 2019

Unintended consequences of patient safety interventions


On the whole there is little evidence that patient safety initiatives at the system level have been beneficial. Here is a systematic review unintended consequences. From the review:

Abstract: This is a systematic review of the literature on unintended consequences of clinical interventions to reduce falls, catheter-related urinary tract infection, and vascular catheter-related infections in hospitalized patients. A systematic search of the literature was conducted in CINAHL and PubMed. We developed a screening tool and a two-stage screening process to identify relevant articles. Nine articles met inclusion criteria, and of those, 8 reported on interventions to reduce patient falls. Four studies reported a positive, unexpected benefit; 3 studies reported a negative, unexpected detriment; and 4 reported a perverse effect (different from what was expected). Three studies reported both positive and perverse effects arising from the intervention. In 4 of the studies, despite fall prevention interventions, patients fell while trying to get to the bathroom, suggesting that interventions to reduce one adverse outcome (i.e., CAUTI) may be associated with another outcome (i.e., patient falls). In some cases, there were positive outcomes for those who implemented and/or evaluated interventions. We encourage colleagues to collect and report data on possible unintended consequences of their interventions to allow a fuller picture of the relationship between intervention and all outcomes to emerge.

These represent the safety areas where Medicare has focused its “no pay for errors” policy.

Friday, February 22, 2019

Sep 1: thumbs up or thumbs down?


A piece in Today's Hospitalist covers some of the ins and outs of CMS's most complicated core measure yet. we’ve yet to realize the unintended consequences. It’s based on data from a survey (and the subjects were “quality officers” and others predisposed to drink the performance kool aid) the results of which suggested that the measure is perceived to be beneficial. But it restricts clinical judgment and is based on ideas deemed out of date by many.

After going through a long list of flaws and potential harms of the measure here's how the Today’s Hospitalist piece concludes (emphasis mine):

“While some people’s instinct is to just reject” the measure, Dr. Barbash says he draws a different conclusion from his research. “We have a professional obligation to try to make it better in ways that ultimately help us provide the best care for patients.” While SEP-1 “has gotten us to start paying attention to the most important killer of hospitalized patients,” he believes a revised sepsis measure could do better.

He's asserting that it took a CMS core measure to even get us to start paying attention to sepsis. Where has he been the last 15 years?


Tuesday, January 29, 2019

Are specialists ruining medicine in the US?



Her solution? Let primary care docs be the gatekeepers who control access to specialists. Didn’t we try that in the 90s with managed care? It didn’t work.

Sunday, January 27, 2019

Readmission penalties five years later


Friday, January 25, 2019

The problem with public reporting in health care


Peter Pronovost, a champion of this sort of thing, along with a couple of other authors, cites weaknesses of public reporting, correctly pointing out that when hospitals do it themselves it’s largely just self promotional. Their solution? Beef up the standards by getting outside organizations like CMS and Leapfrog involved. Seriously? They’ve been at this for years with little evidence that patients are really interested, let alone helped.

The CMS sepsis measure


The definition of sepsis is a mess. Sepsis is difficult to reduce to a set of criteria. If you are an experienced clinician you know it when you see it. This is just one reason why the CMS measure is a disaster.

From the linked article:

In changing the clinically significant value of lactate, CMS mandated that clinical practice, hospital protocols, and medical education had to adopt the lower threshold of 2 mmol/L to define severe sepsis and an initial lactate of greater than 4 mmol/L to define septic shock in the absence of robust supportive literature. Physicians are being forced to use government-issued standards of practice and patient care that have not been fully investigated as appropriate and safe. Doctors are no longer permitted to doctor but rather forced to practice cookie cutter one-size-fits-all algorithms with regard to sepsis care. These constraints leave the clinician in the predicament of using best practices versus following mandated guidelines.

We have demonstrated that there are various proposed definitions for sepsis, severe sepsis and septic shock. This is likely due to the fact that unlike myocardial infarction, which has a very precise pathophysiology and organic effect, sepsis is a spectrum of any number of factors. It is not due to one distinct insult but can be caused by a large variety of infectious agents that can infect a variety of anatomic locations. It is not due to one region of the body suffering hypoxia; rather it is due to a dysregulated host response to infection. And that host response is dependent on a variety of uncontrolled factors such as age, sex and comorbidities. It may be impossible to develop definitions that appropriately identify a disease state that is so dependent on multiple variables. Each patient is different and cannot be defined and treated exactly the same way. The CMS definitions are premature and, unlike the various other definitions presented, are mandatory and must be followed by clinicians practicing in the United States.

Why not let doctors be doctors? Because there is so much variation, of course. And as we all know variation is the enemy, right?



SEP-1: another example of performance as a poor surrogate for quality


Here is a report on hospitals’ perceptions of SEP-1:



BACKGROUND: In October 2015, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) implemented the Sepsis CMS Core Measure (SEP-1) program, requiring hospitals to report data on the quality of care for their patients with sepsis.

OBJECTIVE: We sought to understand hospital perceptions of and responses to the SEP-1 program.

DESIGN: A thematic content analysis of semistructured interviews with hospital quality officials.

SETTING: A stratified random sample of short-stay, nonfederal, general acute care hospitals in the United States.

SUBJECTS: Hospital quality officers, including nurses and physicians.

INTERVENTION: None.

MEASUREMENTS: We completed 29 interviews before reaching content saturation.

RESULTS: Hospitals reported a variety of actions in response to SEP-1, including new efforts to collect data, improve sepsis diagnosis and treatment, and manage clinicians’ attitudes toward SEP-1. These efforts frequently required dedicated resources to meet the program’s requirements for treatment and documentation, which were thought to be complex and not consistently linked to patient-centered outcomes. Most respondents felt that SEP-1 was likely to improve sepsis outcomes. At the same time, they described specific changes that could improve its effectiveness, including allowing hospitals to focus on the treatment processes most directly associated with improved patient outcomes and better aligning the measure’s sepsis definitions with current clinical definitions.

CONCLUSIONS: Hospitals are responding to the SEP-1 program across a number of domains and in ways that consistently require dedicated resources. Hospitals are interested in further revisions to the program to alleviate the burden of the reporting requirements and help them optimize the effectiveness of their investments in quality-improvement efforts.

Sunday, January 13, 2019

Patients’ perceptions of doctors’ relations with industry



Background

The Physician Payments Sunshine Act, part of the Affordable Care Act, requires pharmaceutical and medical device firms to report payments they make to physicians and, through its Open Payments program, makes this information publicly available.

Objective

To establish estimates of the exposure of the American patient population to physicians who accept industry payments, to compare these population-based estimates to physician-based estimates of industry contact, and to investigate Americans’ awareness of industry payments.

Design

Cross-sectional survey conducted in late September and early October 2014, with data linkage of respondents’ physicians to Open Payments data.

Participants

A total of 3542 adults drawn from a large, nationally representative household panel.

Main Measures

Respondents’ contact with physicians reported in Open Payments to have received industry payments; respondents’ awareness that physicians receive payments from industry and that payment information is publicly available; respondents’ knowledge of whether their own physician received industry payments.

Key Results

Among the 1987 respondents who could be matched to a specific physician, 65% saw a physician who had received an industry payment during the previous 12 months. This population-based estimate of exposure to industry contact is much higher than physician-based estimates from the same period, which indicate that 41% of physicians received an industry payment. Across the six most frequently visited specialties, patient contact with physicians who had received an industry payment ranged from 60 to 85%; the percentage of physicians with industry contact in these specialties was much lower (35–56%). Only 12% of survey respondents knew that payment information was publicly available, and only 5% knew whether their own doctor had received payments.
Conclusions


Patients’ contact with physicians who receive industry payments is more prevalent than physician-based measures of industry contact would suggest. Very few Americans know whether their own doctor has received industry payments or are aware that payment information is publicly available.

Nor do they seem to care.

Saturday, January 12, 2019

In case you didn’t know, over a third of ER docs are industry puppets


I am a close follower of the Emergency Medicine Literature of Note blog. The author, Ryan Radecki, takes a skeptical approach to surrogate endpoints and is generally careful to avoid conclusions that over reach the data.

He seems to have violated his own rules, however, in his approach to this report on industry gifts to physicians. From the paper:

Objective

Characterize the frequency and magnitude of all categories of publicly reported financial payments made to emergency physicians (EPs) in the United States (U.S.) in 2017.

Methods

This cross-sectional study of the 2017 Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services Open Payments Database was exempt from Institutional Review Board Review. We calculated descriptive statistics of the frequency, type, and amount (medians) of general, research, and ownerships transactions made to EPs from industry, described regional differences of median payments to EPs, and characterized the drugs or devices most commonly associated with transactions.

Results

In 2017, among 40,899 practicing U.S. EPs, 14,447 (35.4%) received 51,870 general payments from industry totaling $12,870,832. The median per-physician payment was $18.30 (interquartile range [IQR], $13.63–$60.90). The most frequent transaction was food and beverage (89.6%), though most payments by dollar amount were related to speaker and consulting fees (74.5%). Antithrombotics were the most frequently drug or device associated with transactions. Only 35 (0.08%) and 20 (0.05%) EPs had research and ownership relationships with industry, respectively. A significant difference was observed in median payments per physician across all U.S. Census regions (p  less than 0.01) except when comparing Northeast and West (p = 1.00).

Conclusions

Over one-third of U.S. EPs had general payments from industry in 2017, while less than 1% of EPs had either research and ownership payments during this time period. Consistent with previous research, most payments to EPs are of low monetary value. Antithrombotics remain the most frequent drug associated with payments to EPs.


The vast majority of the gifts were small: lunches and dinners. There’s been quite a bit of research showing that even small gifts such as these influence physicians, largely out of their awareness. The problem with this research, extensive as it is, is that it is based on soft surrogate endpoints. Virtually nothing is known about the extent of the influence, let alone any downstream effects that might impact patient outcomes, for good or harm.

But Radecki’s post says this:

It’s CMS Open Payments Database time again, updated for 2017. Sadly, it turns out you or at least one of your closest colleagues is a witting or unwitting puppet of the pharmaceutical industry: a full 35.4% of practicing U.S. emergency physicians received payments from industry last year.

Clearly out of keeping with his usually cautions approach. Doesn’t the issue deserve more nuance?

Tuesday, January 08, 2019

Health insurance expansion and the incidence of sudden cardiac death



Abstract

Background Health insurance has many benefits including improved financial security, greater access to preventive care, and better self‐perceived health. However, the influence of health insurance on major health outcomes is unclear. Sudden cardiac arrest prevention represents one of the major potential benefits from health insurance, given the large impact of sudden cardiac arrest on premature death and its potential sensitivity to preventive care.

Methods and Results We conducted a pre–post study with control group examining out‐of‐hospital cardiac arrest (OHCA) among adult residents of Multnomah County, Oregon (2015 adult population 636 000). Two time periods surrounding implementation of the Affordable Care Act were evaluated: 2011–2012 (“pre‐expansion”) and 2014–2015 (“postexpansion”). The change in OHCA incidence for the middle‐aged population (45–64 years old) exposed to insurance expansion was compared with the elderly population (age greater than or equal to 65 years old) with constant near‐universal coverage. Rates of OHCA among middle‐aged individuals decreased from 102 per 100 000 (95% CI: 92–113 per 100 000) to 85 per 100 000 (95% CI: 76–94 per 100 000), P value 0.01. The elderly population experienced no change in OHCA incidence, with rates of 275 per 100 000 (95% CI: 250–300 per 100 000) and 269 per 100 000 (95% CI: 245–292 per 100 000), P value 0.70.

Conclusions Health insurance expansion was associated with a significant reduction in OHCA incidence. Based on this pilot study, further investigation in larger populations is warranted and feasible.

Friday, August 31, 2018

Give doctors tools, not rules


Wednesday, April 11, 2018

Sunday, April 08, 2018

Not challenging science is anti-science??


But I thought science was inherently self-challenging. To Dr. John’s credit, though, he does make some good points about the thought police. They’re everywhere in medicine.

Doctors in the US make too much money



Monday, February 05, 2018

MACRA skepticism



It is based on the dubious idea of “value based purchasing” and promises to be the biggest disruption to our profession since the Prospective Payment System.

Tuesday, January 23, 2018

Jump into the political fray or you’ve made the wrong moral choice and are guilty of harm


And be sure you line up on the correct side. Berwick.

Saturday, December 16, 2017

Joint Commission sued over allegations about the opioid crisis


So who’s to blame for the opioid epidemic? How did we get where we are today? There's been a lot of finger pointing at the pharmaceutical industry and while it deserves a share of the blame there have been other factors. The Joint Commission had some pretty aggressive pain management standards starting back in the late 90s. Unless you’re in mid or late career (and didn’t have your head in the sand about 18 years ago) you wouldn’t remember this but I do. Oh, how well I remember it.

I remember our joint commission surveys with all the preparation we went through and how pain management was the hot topic of conversation. There were lots of documents from those days (old Joint Commission manuals and hospital committee records) that I'm sure folks would like to suppress and I can say the same thing for certain CME materials promulgated by our own professional societies who tried to shove this pseudoscience down our throats.

Fingers have been pointed at Joint Commission for a while now concerning this, so recently they issued a disclaimer. That vigorous attempt to deflect blame was recently called out by Skeptical Scalpel and I linked to the post here. From that post it would appear that Joint Commission cooperated with industry in pushing for expanded indications for narcotics while minimizing risks.

So the latest news is that four cities in West Virginia have sued the Joint Commission, claiming economic losses not only for the health care of victims but for the cost of efforts to stem the epidemic. This came out just last month (H/T EP monthly). Whether or not they prevail, this will shine light on the history of the problem by bringing old documents into public view that up to now would have been difficult to access. Joint Commission, in their denial that they contributed to the problem, correctly points out that they did not coin the phrase “fifth vital sign.” But, as the documentation shows, they did a great deal to propagate the idea.

Here are the introductory paragraphs from the court document:

1. In 2001, Defendant JCAHO, as part of its certification program for health care organizations, teamed with Purdue Pharma L.P. and its affiliates (“Purdue”), as well as other opioid manufacturers, to issue Pain Management Standards (or “Standards”) and other related documents that grossly misrepresented the addictive qualities of opioids and fostered dangerous pain control practices, the result of which was often the inappropriate provision of opioids with disastrous adverse consequences for individuals, families, and communities. These dangerous Standards, with minor modifications, exist to this day.

2. JCAHO zealously enforces these dangerous Standards through its certification program and has persisted in this course of action even after Purdue was found by the Food and Drug Administration to have misrepresented the quality of its opioid OxyContin in 2003, after Purdue pleaded guilty to felony criminal charges for making misrepresentations respecting OxyContin in 2007, and after warnings from health care professionals concerning the horrible impact wrought by the Standards.

Wow.

It then goes on to quote from past JC standards:

36. For the 2001 Standard RI.1.2.8, The Official Handbook provides “[e]xamples of Implementation of Standard RI.1.2.8,” the first of which is: “Pain is considered the ‘fifth’ vital sign in the hospital’s care of patients...”

46. The 2001 JCAHO Monograph stated: “Some clinicians have inaccurate and exaggerated concerns about addiction, tolerance and risk of death...”

62. The 2003 JCAHO Monograph stated:

a. “Clinicians’ misconceptions about pain treatments could include an exaggerated fear of addiction resulting from use of opioids; confusion about the differences between addiction, physical dependence, and tolerance; or unwarranted concerns about the potential for the side effect of respiratory depression.”…

c. “Many practices are faulty and outdated (e.g., promoting the idea that there is a high risk of addiction when opioids are taken for pain relief).”…

The pharmaceutical industry, our professional organizations and published articles promoted pseudoscientific dogma on pain management. Joint Commission made it a mandate.



Saturday, October 28, 2017